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Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation. By J.C. Sharman. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2006. Pp. x + 211 pages. $39.95 cloth.

Reviewed by Anthony C. Infanti, University of Pittsburgh

In 1998, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued a
report titled “Harmful Tax Competition—An Emerging Global Issue” (14). In this report, the
OECD sought to “define what harmful tax competition was, to make an argument for just why it
was harmful, and to set out a response to the problem” (42). In reality, the OECD proposed two
different responses to the “problem,” based on the relative power of the offender (45, 55-56).
With respect to its own member states, the OECD decided upon a collaborative approach, opting
for peer review and peer pressure to urge the elimination of potentially harmful preferential tax
regimes. With respect to the weaker, non-member tax havens, however, the OECD took a
confrontational and exclusionary approach—threatening to blacklist the tax havens and apply
“defensive measures” to coerce their cooperation, if necessary. Interestingly, despite an obvious
imbalance of power, the OECD has now spent nearly a decade backpedaling from this report,
and it has essentially “failed in its central goal of preventing tax havens from using tax
concessions to attract foreign investment” (8).
In Havens in a Storm, J.C. Sharman approaches this David and Goliath struggle from a
political science perspective. Relying on a combination of public documents, fieldwork, and
interviews, Sharman attempts to explain how a few dozen relatively powerless tax havens were
able to defeat the OECD—a coalition of powerful countries including the United States, Great
Britain, France, Germany, and Japan (7-8). Sharman begins by explaining why the OECD
member states chose not to take military or economic action against the tax havens (49-69).
Sharman then quite persuasively explains how the OECD, having opted for a rhetorical struggle,
was outflanked by the tax havens (70-100). In what became a struggle over reputations (10148), the tax havens deftly used the OECD’s own rhetoric against it by arguing that the OECD
was infringing their sovereignty, was trying to impose standards on them that it had not imposed
on its own members (e.g., Luxembourg and Switzerland), and was unilaterally setting the terms
of the debate rather than treating them as equals (71). It is worth noting that Sharman further
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attributes the OECD’s failure to prevent the tax havens from engaging in “harmful tax
competition” to its very choice to use exclusionary and confrontational tactics against them, as
these tactics departed from the OECD’s usual mode of (co-)operation—both with member and
non-member states (134-35, 145-48).
Havens in a Storm will be of particular interest to those in the fields of international tax
and international relations; however, it should also be of more general interest, especially to
those concerned with the dynamics of struggles between the powerful and the weak. Indeed, as
Sharman notes, the struggle between the OECD and the tax havens is a nice example of a
“critique within hegemony”; that is, of a subordinated group’s use of the dominant group’s own
symbols and values against it (145). In the right circumstances—such as here, where the
OECD’s effectiveness is tied so closely to its reputation as an impartial, “scientific” authority
(133-34, 135-38, 146)—a critique within hegemony can be a powerful mode of attack, because
“‘it … threatens to appeal to sincere members of the elite in a way that an attack from outside
their values could not’” (145).
Yet, Sharman could have enhanced his analysis had he probed a bit more deeply the
question of why the tax havens were able so quickly to succeed against the OECD. In particular,
it might have been helpful for him to recognize the hollowness of the OECD’s self-identification
as, and reputation for being, a “scientific” authority in the area of taxation. Sharman did
recognize early on in the book the absence of “expert consensus” on the “problem” of tax
competition; however, the failure of tax competition to constitute “a technical, aseptic matter
open to definitive resolution by an epistemic community of experts” is by no means a unique
occurrence in the tax policy area (36-40). In fact, tax policy involves no immutable rules;
instead, it is highly political in nature, and its association in the popular imagination with
economics serves only to cloak it with a false aura of scientificity (see, e.g., Kornhauser 1996,
610). This observation could have aided Sharman in explaining the quick success of the tax
havens. More importantly, it renders Sharman’s very interesting findings more generalizable
than he had anticipated (161).
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